Gaza: How to de-escalate?

Semantics over "ceasefire" versus "pauses" are a sideshow. Western credibility is crumbling in the Global South..

Right now, Western leaders seem to be pursuing two short-term political objectives over Gaza:

• achieving an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in order to gain access for aid agencies and evacuate Western citizens - which is being termed "humanitarian pauses" in diplomatic language to avoid any suggestion they will be permanent; and

• deterring, delaying and limiting the scope of any Israeli ground offensive into Gaza, both in order to buy time for hostage negotiations and because of profound US misgivings over a ground operation, as briefed to the Washington Post.

As I wrote in my op-ed for The New European last night, for reasons I will return to below, the #1 objective of Western leaders should be to deter, and distance themselves from, any full-scale Israeli invasion and occupation of Gaza.

As per numerous briefings after Blinken’s meeting with Israel's war cabinet: there is no plan for what to do once Hamas is defeated, and no theory of victory. Any ground offensive designed to conquer and occupy Gaza City risks inflicting civilian casualties on an unacceptable scale, no matter how justified Israel is in its fight against Hamas.

The objective of last night's attack on Beit Hanoun is unclear but the IDF claimed it had hit 150 "underground" targets. Coming simultaneously with a substantial raid, and the sudden shutdown of internet/cellphone access this was clearly a change of tempo.

However, according to well-sourced US correspondents (WaPo’s John Hudson and Fox’ Jacqui Heinrich), the background was a US attempt on Friday to persuade Israel to accept a delay to, and downsize, its ground operations.

Nobody I've spoken to believes Israel can be convinced not to invade. Indeed an IDF announcement this afternoon, in English, telling Palestinians to move south from Gaza City immediately, reinforces the likelihood that a full-scale ground operation north of Wadi Gaza could happen soon.

What the experts think

On Friday RUSI hosted an online expert panel on the conflict, and what follows is a summary of, and commentary on, what I learned from it. This is about analysis, not solutions: the event helped me clarify some of the questions I, and people I speak to, have been asking since 7 October.

The participants were drawn from a range of specialisms and showed deep knowledge of the region and its languages. They were: Tobias Borck (Middle East Security), Sam Cranny-Evans (Military Sciences), H.A. Hellyer, (Middle East Security), Michael Stephens (ditto, ex-FCDO).

• Everyone on the panel was ultra-pessimistic. As one put it, there are two scenarios: Israel invades Gaza but the Iranian proxies remain restrained; or Israel invades Gaza but it escalates into a regional war. Escalation could come not only out of Lebanon but in the West Bank or Golan.

• Nobody on the panel thought the 7 October attack was part of an Iranian masterplan to blow up both the JCPOA and the region; however, most acknowledged that Iran's strategic goal is to prevent the normalisation of relations between Israel and its neighbours.

• Though no major actor wants regional escalation, any random incident could could kick it off, was the warning. The US carrier taskforces, for example, are not there to take offensive action, but to deter regional escalation. Through them, the USA is trying to signal to GCC that its traditional security architecture and focus on the region, still exists.

• One expert predicted the Israeli ground offensive won't happen until the 360,000 called up reservists fully equipped and mobilised. Its intensity will depend on whether Hamas resists in situ (from initial accounts of the Friday night incursion, they did).

• By backing Israel, and failing to back calls for a ceasefire at the UN, the USA, the Anglosphere, the EU and the wider West have "lost the global south". This leaves a big opening for Russia to promote the destabilisation of the region - witness the Hamas meeting in Moscow. It won't actively push things further - since it is not in Russia's interest for the Middle East to be unstable; however, Putin understands that instability is worse for America than it is for Russia.

• While UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly's trip to the region was seen as successful, Rishi Sunak's follow up trip was not. It did not look clear what his aim was, nor what he achieved.

• There was an atmosphere of mea culpa among some of the experts: not only did Jake Sullivan read the situation wrong in the infamous Foreign Affairs article, whose original print version that said the region was “quieter than it had been for decades”: most Western diplomats did the same.

• It was interesting to hear some of the panelists complain that it is now "politicians not experts" leading the Western response. The perceived problem is that politicians have limited expertise and are acting emotionally, chasing short-term events (and electoral cycles), rather than thinking strategically. It’s a symptom of the wider culture shock in politics, to find out how strongly Western societies feel about Israel/Palastine, and how generationally weak support for Israel is becoming in civil society.

• There was consensus that it is not clear what Israel's end game is. When Biden asked Netanyahu about the endgame of the operation, those with access say he did not get a clear answer. It's already clear that post-war Gaza will not have a viable economy. It will be permanently dependent on Israel, aid donors and foreign neighbours, even if Hamas somehow maintains a grip on the administration.

• Because of all these factors, one of the experts said: "a ceasefire is a security necessity, not some high humanitarian ideal".

Processing the insights

How should we process these insights? I drew three conclusions.

First, in the absence of firm evidence to the contrary, it is logical to believe that Iran has not designed this as a multiphase offensive to destroy Israel. That's not to say that Iran won't take advantage, or that the proxies - in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq - are totally under its control. Therefore a regional war is not scripted into the situation - but could happen as a result of uncontrollable events.