Evidence is accumulating that Western governments finally understand the severity of the Russian threat; that Putin's armies are not a "busted flush"; and that even a frozen conflict outcome in Ukraine will embolden him to further aggression in Europe.
Exhibit One is the story leaked to Bild, about German government wargaming the scenario of a potential 2025 conflict with Russia, premised on Trump's victory in the November general election.
Exhibit Two is the National Defence Industrial Strategy released by the US DoD. The report, the first of its kind, signals severe and urgent problems with America's defence industrial base and its supply chains, which could not currently stand up to a prolonged conflict with a Russian or Chinese peer.
Exhibit Three is Grant Shapps' first major speech as UK Defence Secretary. Though he promised no uplift to the UK's current defence budget, which stands at 2.2% of GDP, he gave a pretty clear signal that such an uplift is coming - though whether it will deliver the 2.5% "aspiration", and whether that will be enough are open questions.
Exhibit Four is a widely read and commented-on Twitter thread by the Oslo-based analyst Fabian Hoffman, who argues that the conflict Russia is preparing does not need fully regenerated land forces in order to inflict a strategic defeat on NATO, but rather to call its bluff in a conventional escalation scenario, which could be launched within two to three years.
Exhibit Five is the reported but unpublished Estonian government blueprint for victory in Ukraine, submitted to the Ramstein Group, which argues that Western countries should significantly upgrade their defence production output to focus their economic strength against Russia, which is doubling its military spending this year.
In this issue of Conflict & Democracy I will use a combination of the Bild scenario and the framework Hoffman outlines to illustrate the stark and urgent choices facing defence ministries across NATO, and in particular the UK.
Russia’s route to defeating NATO
Hoffman writes that the type of offensive Russia could be planning:
"…is not a contest of forces, but primarily a risk-taking competition. The question becomes: Who will be the first to back down when confronted with the prospect of largescale war, including potential exchanges of strategic nuclear warheads?"
In that spirit, here is the Bild scenario stripped of its date-specifics and simplified into six phases, followed by a conflict period whose dynamics derived from Hoffman's framework.
1. Russia mobilises 200,000 extra troops and uses its doubled defence budget to deliver significant advances on the Ukrainian battlefield.
2. Russia steps up hybrid warfare across the Western world, targeting the Baltics as the "state victim" with a full spectrum of cyber, disinformation and political provocations
3. Russia moves massive troop numbers into Belarus, to menace the border with Poland and Lithuania, and flies both troops and new long-rance missiles into Kaliningrad. Its signalled aim is to attack the Suwałki Gap.
4. Russia stages border provocations, involving riots and deaths, and accuses NATO of preparing to attack Russia. It mobilises the Russian-speaking populations of the Baltics to cause civil unrest.
5. As NATO's political resolve falters (in the Bild scenario, this happens during the transition from Biden to a Trump 2.0 presidency) Russia moves three manouver divisions to the Belarus border.
6. In response NATO orders the mobilisation of 300,000 troops to its borders with Russia and Belarus, whose mission is to deter a conventional attack. The Bundeswehr excercise ends 30 days after that, with success measured by the maintainance of peace.
7. However, NATO's mobilisation fails to deter Russia's attack, which follows two principles: "aggressive sanctuarisation" and "pre-emptive de-escalation strikes". This means that Day X would involve long-range conventional strikes on West European cities, to deter key NATO countries from invoking Article V; and that Russia would extend its nuclear defence umbrella to all territory captured in the first days of fighting, explicitly threatening a nuclear response to a NATO conventional counter-attack.
Hoffman writes:
"As Cold War historians know, the balance of military power is not deterministic of outcomes in risk-taking competitions. Instead, they are often determined by the balance of resolve; i.e., the relative willingness to remain steadfast even as risks are increasing."
"This is why Russia pursues this type of strategy. Russia does not need to match NATO's conventional power. As long as NATO gives in first amid mounting psychological pressure due to a lack of resolve, Russia can walk away with a victory."
Given Putin's repeated statements of intent, there is no reason to regard this scenario as extreme, or "worst case". In fact, Western disunity - with Orban sabotaging support for Ukraine and Fico's Slovakia joining in - suggests there are strong incentives for him to try it.
If it does exist on a list of options for the Kremlin, what are the potential deterrents and obstacles?
How can we deter this?
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